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This is a time of increased interest in local government finance in Kentucky, as evidenced 
by the creation of a Task Force on Local Taxation, established by the General Assembly. 
The final report of the Task Force offers significant recommendations, including an 
amendment of the state constitution that would provide the General Assembly with the 
flexibility to institute new instruments of local government finance. The present paper 
reviews the status of local government finance in Kentucky and discusses some of the 
key findings and recommendations of the Task Force. As the Task Force report clearly 
recognizes, informed analysis of local tax policy in Kentucky is hampered by inadequate 
data on local government finances. This paper identifies some of these deficiencies and a 
number of important policy issues that require further policy analysis, particularly if the 
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As all Kentuckians are aware, tax reform in the Commonwealth has been the 
focus of concerted attention in the past few years.  We have already seen significant 
change in the state's tax structure, including such noteworthy changes as the elimination 
of the corporation license tax.  Possible reform of local government taxation is now on 
the agenda:  a Tax Force on Local Taxation, established in 2005 by House Bill 272, has 
devoted a year of effort to the study of local tax issues and has recently (June, 2006) 
issued its final report.    What are some of the concerns that have prompted this 
examination of local government finance?  What has the Task Force proposed?  What 
issues require further analysis?  The issuance of the Task Force report makes this an 
opportune time to review the status of local government finance in Kentucky, to examine 
the findings and recommendations of the Task Force, and to consider some of the policy 
options facing the citizens of the Commonwealth.  These are the goals of the present 
paper. 
Because of the complexity of local government structure and financing, Section 2 
begins with a concise overview of the system of local government finance in Kentucky.  
This system is an outgrowth of a body of constitutional and statutory control and 
regulation of local governments which define the taxing powers of these units of 
government.  Section 3 describes the most important of these constraints and discusses 
some of their possible effects.  With this background, Section 4 turns to a review the Task 
Force report.  Section 5 concludes.   
 
2.  Local Government Structure and Finance in Kentucky and the 
Nation 
  1 
As is true in many states, the system of local government finance in Kentucky is a 
somewhat intricate affair.  There are many types of local governments, performing an 
extraordinary variety of tasks, and deriving revenues from many diverse sources.  The 
great British economist Alfred Marshall is purported to have said that “all short 
statements about economics, with the possible exception of this, are false;” the same can 
certainly be said about local government finance.  Still, it is important to see the forest for 
the trees.  At the risk of some oversimplification, this section begins with a review of 
some of the key elements of local government structure and finance in Kentucky and 
relates these to the rest of the nation.
1    
2.1 Structure and Financing of Local Government in Kentucky: A 
Concise Summary 
Types of Local Governments. First, it is important to realize that there are many 
different types of local government in Kentucky, as in all states.  Of greatest importance 
are Kentucky’s counties, municipalities, school districts, and “special districts.”   
Kentucky is a “county-rich” state: its 120 counties, serving a population of just 
4.1 million, have a mean population of only about 35,000.  There are several large 
counties, and these contain a large fraction of the state’s total population; the remainder 
thus have quite modest numbers of residents.  (By way of contrast, the state of California 
has only about half as many counties (58), with a total state population of about 36.1 
million – over 600,000 residents per county.)  Counties play a particularly important role 
in providing public services outside of municipal boundaries, in regulating land use and 
development, and as administrative units of government.   
  2Kentucky’s 433 municipalities vary widely in size.  They are grouped into 6 
administrative classes, based mainly on population. Louisville/Jefferson County is the 
only city of the “first class” in the state.  Cities with populations between 20,000 and 
100,000 and Lexington /Fayette County, a total of 13 altogether, constitute the second 
class. There are 19 third class cities (8,000-20,000 population) and more than 100 cities 
each in the fourth, fifth, and sixth classes.  The last of these classes consists of 176 cities 
with populations under 1,000.  Municipalities are important providers of public services 
within their boundaries.   
Public education services are provided by nearly 200 local school districts in 
Kentucky.  To a much greater degree than other local units of government, school 
districts depend on state government financial assistance, which accounts for about half 
of aggregate school district revenues.   This financial assistance is delivered through a 
complex formula system that presumably attempts to achieve some state educational 
policy goals, and a discussion of school district financing therefore quickly becomes 
entangled in issues of educational policy.  These issues go beyond the scope of the 
present essay, which is limited to some general remarks about the overall structure of 
state/local financing for education and about the advantages and disadvantages of more or 
less decentralization of education finance.  (For further discussion of school finance, see 
Wildasin (2001, pp. 90-101).)   
Another important but very heterogeneous category of local governments in 
Kentucky are the so-called “special districts.”  These units, sometimes created as sub-
entities of other localities, provide park, flood control, transportation, fire, emergency, 
sanitation, health, and other services.  According to the 2002 Census of Governments, 
  3Kentucky has 720 special districts.  This count, however, excludes numerous other 
agencies and authorities which, to some degree, fall under the control of other units of 
government but which also possess some degree of independent authority, including the 
authority to issue debt.  
Revenue Sources for Local Governments. In general, local governments in 
Kentucky depend upon property taxes, “occupational license” taxes (imposed on the 
earnings of individuals and on the incomes of businesses), and taxes on insurance 
premiums as their principal sources of tax revenue.  School districts derive revenues from 
taxes imposed on the gross receipts of utilities; as of 2005, this tax, formerly collected at 
the local level, is administered at the state level with proceeds transferred to school 
districts.  Taxes on telecommunications, also previously imposed by local governments, 
are now collected at the state level as well, with revenues paid out to localities in amounts 
corresponding to previous local collections.  Local governments also rely on various 
nontax sources of revenue and on transfers from the state government; the latter are 
particularly important for school districts.   
The key features of this system of finance are readily summarized.  In order to 
provide some quantitative perspective, Table 1 provides basic data on the financing of 
local government and of state and local government combined for Kentucky and for all 
state and local governments in the US for 2003-2004.   
First, Kentucky has a relatively centralized system of finance: local governments 
raise only 40% of total state/local revenues, compared to the US average of 58%.  In 
Kentucky, the state government is “large” relative to local governments.  
  4Second, state aid to local governments in Kentucky is not markedly different from 
that in the rest of the nation: 44% of local government revenue derives from 
intergovernmental transfers, compared to 39% for the nation as a whole. As is true for 
other states, transfers from the Federal government are not a very substantial source of 
local government revenues in Kentucky. 
Third, turning now to the composition of own-source revenues (i.e., revenues 
other than transfers from higher-level governments), note to begin with that Kentucky’s 
localities depend heavily on nontax sources of revenue, which account for fully 42% of 
all local government own-source revenues.  In this respect, Kentucky’s localities are 
somewhat less tax-dependent than local governments elsewhere, which obtain 37% of 
their own-source revenues from nontax sources.  
Fourth, property taxes are the most important source of tax revenue for localities 
in Kentucky, accounting for about 58% of all local taxes.  This figure is much lower in 
Kentucky, however, than in the rest of the nation, where localities obtain almost three-
fourths (73%) of their tax revenues from property taxes.  Kentucky localities differ quite 
dramatically from those elsewhere in that they raise more than one-fourth (27%) of their 
tax revenues from “occupational license taxes,” treated for Census purposes as a form of 
income tax. 
Local Taxation in Kentucky and the US. Putting some of these basic facts 
together, it is apparent that Kentucky’s combined system of state and local government 
finance differs from the rest of the nation in two important and related respects.  First, 
government revenues in Kentucky depend heavily on  on state-level taxation, with 
relatively little revenue derived from local governments.  Secondly, Kentucky’s fiscal 
  5system depends comparatively heavily on individual income taxation and is less 
property-tax dependent than other states.  In fact, in their relative importance, individual 
income and property taxes in Kentucky are almost precisely an inversion of the national 
average:  in Kentucky, property and income taxes account for 19% and 32%, 
respectively, of combined state/local tax revenues, whereas the corresponding figures for 
the nation are 32% and 21%.   The extra share of income taxes in Kentucky arises 
entirely from local taxation: at the state government level alone, individual taxes account 
for 32% of total tax revenues both in Kentucky and for all state governments in the nation 
as a whole.  This testifies to the important and rather unique role of “occupational license 
taxes’ in local government finance in Kentucky.   
In summary, compared to national averages, Kentucky’s combined state/local 
fiscal system is “over-weighted” at the state level and “under-weighted” at the local level, 
and it is “over-weighted” toward income taxation and “under-weighted” toward property 
taxation, mainly because of the heavy dependence of localities on occupational license 
taxes.  These characteristics of Kentucky’s fiscal system are of long-standing and have 
been amply documented in other studies, including Boardman (2006), Hoyt (2001), 
Martie (2001), and Wildasin (2001).   
2.2 Potential Structural Reforms 
Differences between Kentucky’s fiscal system and those found elsewhere in the 
nation provide no a priori indication that Kentucky’s policies are better or worse than 
those found elsewhere.  To begin with, policymakers and voters in different states and 
localities may select different policies because these jurisdictions differ in their economic 
structure, population characteristics, and other fundamental attributes.  They may also 
  6have different policy preferences.  And, finally, there is no magic formula that dictates 
what system of taxation is “best” for any one level of government or for a state and local 
fiscal system.   Nevertheless, comparisons of fiscal systems can usefully highlight 
important distinctions and suggest potentially fruitful lines of analysis.  They also 
indicate likely feasible (though not necessarily desirable) avenues of policy reform.   
On the basis of the simple comparisons just provided, there is a reasonable 
presumption that Kentucky’s localities could, if desired, assume greater responsibility for 
financing public services and that the state government could reduce the overall level of 
revenues that it collects.  It is important to remember, however, that localities in 
Kentucky are no more heavily dependent on state government fiscal transfers than 
localities in other states, that is, the lower level of local revenue collection in Kentucky is 
accompanied by lower levels of local relative to state government expenditures.  Thus, if 
Kentucky were to attempt to mimic the national average fiscal balance between state and 
local governments, “decentralization” on the revenue side (increasing the weight of local 
relative to state taxes) would have to be accompanied by comparable decentralization on 
the expenditure side.  
This immediately raises a fundamental issue, sometimes called “the assignment 
problem” in the literature of fiscal federalism: which government responsibilities are or 
should be assigned to each level of government?  A rebalancing of state/local spending in 
Kentucky away from the state government would entail some shifting of expenditure 
responsibilities to local governments.  Such a shift could take place in many ways, either 
by explicit transfer of functions from state to local governments or, more implicitly, 
simply by cutting state spending and leaving it to local governments to decide whether to 
  7increase local spending on the same or similar functions, to expand spending in other 
areas, or simply to maintain current local spending and functions, resulting in a net 
shrinkage of combined state and local spending (and taxation).  A transfer of 
responsibility for the maintenance of certain roads from the state to county governments 
exemplifies the first option.  The second option might be illustrated by a cutback in state 
spending on natural resources, public safety, or financial support for local school 
districts.  Local governments are already actively involved in each of these functional 
areas and, if desired, could augment their spending in each in response to cutbacks in 
state services.  In the absence of state mandates, the extent of any such adjustments 
would be left to the discretion of local governments and it is likely that different localities 
would respond in different ways, depending on individual circumstances and on the 
nature of the change in state government policy.  Of course, all of these possible 
adjustments could occur in reverse if, initially, the state government increases its 
involvement in and spending on roads, natural resources, public safety, or elementary and 
secondary education.  From these remarks, it should be clear that reassignments of 
functions between state and local governments can certainly affect the levels of state and 
local taxation, but that such reassignments can also have many other important effects.  In 
particular, changes in functional assignments involve the expenditure side of state and 
local government finance, first and foremost, while carrying important implications for  
the revenue side as well.   
Closely related to the assignment problem is the issue of government structure.  
For instance, consider whether Kentucky should retain its “county-rich” organizational 
structure.  Transportation and communication costs have fallen dramatically since most 
  8of Kentucky’s counties were created in the period 1810-1830.  It is possible that many 
counties could be usefully consolidated, thus, effectively, “reassigning upward” some of 
the functions now performed by counties with very small numbers of residents to new, 
larger county units.  Conceivably, consolidated county governments, perhaps equipped 
with larger and more professional administrative staffs than can now be sustained, would 
be better able to manage complex tasks.  They might therefore be better candidates for 
“downward reassignment” of some functions now performed at the state government 
level, allowing the state government to streamline its operations.  This restructuring of 
county governments could thus facilitate a shift in the state’s fiscal balance away from 
the state government and toward the local governments.  
Of course, any such initiative would be a major undertaking and it is being 
discussed here mainly in order to illustrate the nature of the subtle and complex 
consequences that can follow from changes in government structure. A less dramatic 
reform that nonetheless raises similar issues of structure, functional assignment, and 
finances would be an overhaul of the system of special districts and other special public 
authorities in Kentucky.  The numbers, functions, and financing of these special entities 
could either be expanded or contracted, allowing for growth or contraction of the local 
government sector as a whole or of a reconfiguration of responsibilities and funding 
among local governments. As discussed in Section 4, their status at present is quite 
murky because little information about their activities is readily available. A thorough 
inventory of these units of government and of their finances might motivate a serious 
reconsideration of their role in the system of local governance in Kentucky.  
 
3.  State Regulation of Local Taxation 
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As we have seen, local governments utilize a diverse array of revenue 
instruments, including property taxes, occupational license taxes, and nontax revenues 
and charges.  All of these revenue instruments must comply with the fundamental 
constraints imposed by the state constitution as well as with statutory controls imposed 
by legislative action.  This section describes the main features of existing controls on 
local taxing powers. 
The constitution recognizes the power of localities to tax property, subject to 
limits on maximum tax rates.  In particular, Section 157 limits the maximum municipal 
tax rates to $0.75-$1.50 per dollar of assessed valuation depending (inversely) on city 
size, and to $0.50 per dollar of assessed valuation to all counties.  In addition, under 
Section 181, the General Assembly may authorize localities to impose excise taxes and 
“license fees” on many “trades, occupations, and professions,” providing the 
constitutional sanction for local occupational taxes and for taxes on insurance premiums.  
Section 181 is interpreted to preclude local sales taxes (LRC (2006b, p. 12)).  It also 
specifically prevents the state from collecting taxes on behalf of local governments, 
which may preclude some types of “revenue sharing” arrangements, as discussed further 
below.   
The main statutory controls on local taxation pertain to property taxes and 
occupational license taxes.  (Tax rates on insurance premiums are not limited by statute.)  
These constraints warrant further discussion. 
HB44. Perhaps the best-known limitation on local taxation is House Bill 44 
(HB44), enacted in 1979, which limits local property tax revenues for counties, cities, 
school districts, and special districts to a rate of growth of 4% annually.
2 This statute is 
  10sometimes claimed to have had a variety of effects, for good or ill.  Presumably, its basic 
goal is to restrain local property taxation and, as we have seen, Kentucky is indeed a state 
with comparatively low levels of local property taxation.  Whether Kentucky’s below-
average utilization of property taxes is attributable to the action of HB44 is very difficult 
to determine, however.  It is true that property taxes played a somewhat less prominent 
role in local government finances after 1979.  As reported in Boardman (2006, Table 1), 
county governments derived 29.8% of their revenues from property taxation in 1977, but 
only 22.3% in 1982.  This percentage share has continued to fall over time and now only 
amounts to 12.5%.  It should be noted, however, that county governments obtained 
39.2% of their revenues from property taxes in 1972, which is to say that property tax 
revenues had already declined substantially in importance during the period 1972-1977, 
two years prior to the passage of HB44. For other units of government, as well, reliance 
on property taxation has fluctuated over time.  Over the decade 1972-1982, city 
governments obtained about 20% of their revenue from property taxes, but this share has 
varied in the 12-14% range since that time.  School districts obtained about 25% of their 
revenues from property taxes in 1972 and 1977.  While this percentage fell markedly in 
1982, to less than 15%, state government financial support for schools increased 
substantially at the same time.  Since the early 1980s, school district dependence on local 
property taxes has risen, reaching almost 23% in 2002 – nearly equal to the 26% share of 
the pre-HB44 1970s.  In short, the observed variations in reliance on property taxation 
during the period 1972-2002, by type of locality and over time, do not reveal any clear-
cut effect that is readily attributable to HB44.  
  11  Of course, whatever its effects on aggregate levels of local property tax 
revenues, it is possible that HB44 has constrained property taxes for some specific 
localities at particular points in time. Unfortunately, direct evidence on this point is 
largely unavailable.  HB44 has been in operation for more than a quarter century, during 
which time property valuation administrators for every county have filed documentation 
annually with state authorities certifying HB44 compliance for every local government 
within their counties.  In principle, this documentation could have been compiled and 
published annually, providing a rich body of data on growth in property tax revenues, 
assessed valuations, and tax rates for all local governments in the state.  In practice, it 
appears that no such compilation has taken place, and thus these data have largely 
unavailable for the purposes of policy analysis and evaluation.  The Task Force report 
(LRC (2006a, p. 4)) cites Wildasin (2001) (using data on county governments for 1998-
2000) and the results of a 2005 survey of county governments by the County Judge 
Executives Association, both of which find that a minority of county governments are 
limited by HB44 constraints. There are apparently no other sources that report on the 
extent to which HB44 constraints have been binding on other types of local governments 
or for other periods of time.  Thus, regrettably, the proximate effects of Kentucky’s 
quarter-century experiment with property tax limitation are all but impossible to 
ascertain.
3 This is only one of several fundamental informational deficiencies that hamper 
the analysis of local taxation in Kentucky, as discussed in more detail below.   
Note, however, that the effects of HB44, if they exist at all, may not necessarily 
take the form of binding constraints on local government property tax revenue.  The 
prospect of limited growth in property tax revenues may have stimulated local 
  12governments to develop and utilize various other tax and non-tax sources of revenues that 
would otherwise have not been exploited.  Furthermore, it is possible that the state 
government has offered more generous fiscal assistance to local governments during the 
past quarter-century because of concerns that local revenues would be unduly constrained 
by the operation of HB44.  Finally, it is possible that HB44 has led to a proliferation of 
special districts which are not limited in the amount of property taxes they can collect at 
their inception since HB44 only constraints revenue growth relative to prior periods.  For 
any or all of these reasons, the number of instances in which HB44 is strictly binding on 
local revenues in a given year may be rather small even though its impact on local 
government finance and local government structure may be important.  Short of the 
development of a model of the fiscal interactions between state and local governments, 
there is no way to know whether this may be the case. 
In summary, the fact that constraints on growth in property tax revenues appear 
not to be binding for most counties in recent years may justify a mild presumption that 
HB44 has had comparatively little effect on local governments and that its removal 
would therefore have rather modest consequences.  In this case, HB44 adds complexity to 
state/local fiscal relations with little real benefit or harm.  Beyond this, deficiencies in 
data and a lack of analytical effort imply that very little is known about the effects of 
HB44 on local government finances in Kentucky.  For HB44 detractors and defenders 
alike, this is a highly unsatisfactory state of affairs, providing fertile ground for 
speculation but limited factual and analytical support for the preservation, removal, or 
modification of restrictions on local property taxes.  
  13Occupational license taxes. Occupational license tax rates are also restricted by 
state statute for some units of government.  In particular, school district occupational tax 
rates cannot exceed 0.5%, except for Jefferson County (Louisville), which may impose a 
rate as high as 0.75%.  County governments may impose occupational taxes up to a rate 
of 1%, except for Louisville/Jefferson County for which special regulations apply.  
Municipalities generally are not restricted as to the tax rates they may impose.   
 
To conclude this section, we have seen that local governments in Kentucky are 
subject to a somewhat complex set of limitations on their taxing powers.  Their power to 
tax property is subject to constitutionally-imposed rate limitations as well as to HB44 
limitations on the annual growth of property tax revenues.  Comparatively few localities 
appear to be directly affected by these limitations, although they may have had important 
indirect effects by stimulating other sources of funding for local governments.  
Occupational license taxes are widely utilized by local governments.  Cities are generally 
not limited in the license rates that they may apply, unlike counties and school districts. 
Local governments may also impose taxes on insurance premiums, at rates that are not 
subject to statutory limits.  There are constitutional limitations on the ability of localities 
to impose general sales taxes, as well as on the ability of the state government to impose 
taxes on behalf of local governments.
4  
 
4.  The Task Force Report 
The Final Report of the Task Force on Local Taxation makes several 
recommendations.  Its first and most important substantive recommendation concerns an 
  14amendment to Section 181 of the state constitution.  As discussed above, this provision 
has been interpreted to limit the ability of local governments to impose general sales 
taxes and the ability of the state government to develop a system of revenue sharing with 
local governments.  The Task Force report does not directly advocate the use of local 
sales taxes nor does it provide any specific recommendations regarding state-local 
revenue sharing; its recommendation is more limited in scope, merely proposing a 
constitutional amendment that would allow for the possibility of such reforms, should the 
legislature wish to consider them.  A second focus of the Task Force report is the status 
of special districts: 4 of its 11 recommendations ask for better reporting by special 
districts and better monitoring of their fiscal affairs.  Several other recommendations urge 
improved coordination between local governments and improvements in local tax 
administration.  The Task Force also proposes the establishment of a “local government 
financial database” that would “provide relevant information about local government 
finances to decision makers,” and, one might imagine, also to the public at large.   It is 
clear from this recommendation, and from those pertaining to special districts, that the 
deliberations of the Task Force were hampered by deficiencies in the existing systems for 
collection and reporting of information regarding local government finances.  Let us 
consider the main Task Force recommendations and some of the policy issues that they 
raise.  
Local Sales Taxation. The charge to the Task Force indicated that it should 
explore the possibility of local sales taxation as one method for “generating a comparable 
amount of local revenue,” that is, as a potential replacement for local revenues now 
obtained from other sources. In a similar vein, the Task Force, in its recommendations, 
  15recognizes that if the General Assembly were to allow localities to impose sales taxes, it 
could also attempt to constrain the use of other local taxes so as to keep total local 
revenues at current levels.  In practice, the introduction of the sales tax as a new revenue 
instrument for local governments could well result in increases in revenues for some 
localities, perhaps accompanied by decreases for others.  The report does not discuss 
whether sales taxes would be used by counties, cities, school districts, special districts, or 
by some combination of all of these. If experience in other states can be used as a guide, a 
local sales tax would likely be utilized mainly by localities in the largest metropolitan 
areas in the state, at least in part because of the administrative complexities associated 
with their implementation.  Given the economic importance of the state’s largest 
metropolitan areas, the introduction of such a tax could have a perceptible impact on 
aggregate local revenues which could, however, be offset by limiting other revenue 
sources.  
If the local sales tax is viewed as a potential substitute for existing taxes, would it 
be used to reduce local property, income, or insurance premium taxes?  The sales tax 
might be used to supplement or substitute for the insurance premium tax; both are levied 
on the revenues or sales of businesses, and thus share some administrative similarities, 
but of course the sales tax would be much broader in its application.  On the other hand, 
because of its breadth and because taxes on earnings are (very) broadly similar in their 
economic effects to taxes on consumption, a local sales tax might be viewed as a 
substitute for local occupational license taxes.  Localities differ, of course, in the extent to 
which their residents earn income or make purchases within their own boundaries.  A 
locality with many residents that commute to places of employment in other jurisdictions 
  16may collect relatively little revenue from a tax on earnings, whereas major employment 
centers can derive significant revenues from the earnings of non-resident workers; 
similarly, jurisdictions with major shopping centers might use a local sales tax to obtain 
revenues generated by sales to non-residents as well as residents. For these reasons, a 
switch from local occupational to local sales taxes could have important differential 
revenue impacts across localities. As a third possibility, the introduction of local sales 
taxes could be accompanied by further restrictions on property taxation.  The local sales 
tax differs quite substantially, both in administrative terms and in terms of its economic 
effects, from local property taxes.   
The overall policy advantages or disadvantages of any of the above tax 
substitutions are not immediately apparent and cannot be ascertained without further 
analysis.
5  Presumably such analysis would underpin any future deliberations by the 
General Assembly, should Section 181 be amended to permit local sales taxes.  
Revenue Sharing. The charge to the Task Force also specified that it should 
consider the desirability of revenue sharing for local governments, and the Task Force 
indeed recommends that Section 181 be amended in order to allow such policies.  The 
form, magnitude, and purpose of such revenue sharing is little discussed in the Task 
Force report, however.  The report expresses some concern that a revenue sharing system 
might result in reductions in local tax effort, stating that “any revenue sharing programs 
implemented should require a specified level of local effort before a local government is 
permitted to participate. … The concept is that local governments should help themselves 
before seeking assistance from Frankfort.”   
  17In principle, revenue sharing systems can be devised to serve a variety of different 
policy objectives.  For instance, they can be used to overcome administrative hurdles to 
the use of certain taxes by lower-level governments.  As an illustration, suppose that it 
were considered desirable to make the local occupational tax on individuals more like the 
state income tax by broadening its base to include nonwage income while simultaneously 
preserving exemptions, deductions, credits, and other special features commonly found in 
personal income taxes.  Local governments might find it cumbersome to implement such 
a tax, and it would impose nontrivial compliance costs on taxpayers.  As an alternative, 
the state could share which each locality a portion of the income tax revenue that it 
derives from the taxpayers located there.   
On the other hand, revenue sharing systems can be designed to advance quite 
different goals.  For instance, HB44 or rate limits on local occupational taxes may 
constrain local revenues to an undesirable degree, perhaps leading local authorities to  
“seek assistance from Frankfort” in order to meet urgent expenditure needs.  A system of 
state-local fiscal transfers could be devised that would put additional resources at the 
disposal of local authorities, based on some measure of fiscal need (e.g., inversely related 
to per capita income or assessed property valuation) or in accordance with some other 
criteria.   
Designing a revenue sharing system that achieves its intended objectives is so 
simple matter, however.  The Task Force recognizes that fiscal transfers to local 
governments may result in reductions in local taxes rather than increased funding for 
local services, effectively substituting state funding for local own-source revenues.  The 
Task Force suggests that such transfers can be conditioned on local fiscal effort, for 
  18instance by requiring localities to utilize their local property taxes up to some specified 
levels.  It is also possible to devise revenue sharing formulae that provide additional 
funding for localities that display high levels of tax effort.  In practice, however, it is 
difficult to prevent the erosion of local own-source revenues, and the attempt to do so can 
easily give rise to very complex monitoring and enforcement requirements.  For example, 
suppose that localities maintain their property tax collections in order to comply with 
revenue-sharing regulations while simultaneously reducing their use of charges, fees, and 
other nontax revenue sources.  In this case, the net effect of revenue sharing transfers 
from the state to recipient localities would be to replace local nontax revenues by state 
government revenues.   As is evident from Table 1, local governments in Kentucky 
derive more revenue from such nontax sources than they do from property taxation, so 
there is ample scope for localities to reduce their overall revenue-raising efforts while 
maintaining or even increasing property tax revenues.  In an attempt to maintain overall 
fiscal effort, therefore, the state might be led to monitor and regulate local use of nontax 
revenues in addition to property or other major taxes. The ensuing magnification of state 
control over the details of local finance and policies would likely entail a substantial loss 
of local fiscal and policy autonomy, substantial administrative complexity and cost, and 
reduced overall responsiveness of local fiscal policies to the demands of local residents.   
The prospect of such a policy evolution highlights the importance of achieving the 
utmost clarity in the formulation of fundamental policy objectives and, where possible, of 
using the simplest and most direct methods to achieve them. For instance, if localities are 
perceived to have insufficient revenues at their disposal, it is crucial to determine why 
this should be the case.  Local revenue inadequacy might result from the operation of 
  19state government limitations on local taxing powers such as HB44, in which case 
deregulation of local taxes may be a more transparent and effective policy option than the 
creation of a revenue sharing system, with its associated new body of regulatory 
constraints.  On the other hand, revenue insufficiency may be important mainly for a 
subset of localities, distinguished by type (county, municipal), by levels of income or 
development, or by size.  Clear identification of underlying policy concerns is critically 
important for the design and implementation of effective reforms.   
As the foregoing remarks indicate, revenue sharing systems can be developed for 
many different policy purposes – to allow recipient governments to utilize new revenue 
sources with minimum administrative complexity, to transfer resources to lower-level 
governments with high fiscal “needs,” to shift the overall burden of financing state and 
local government away from the latter and toward the former, or for any number of other 
reasons.  The optimal design of a revenue sharing system depends crucially on the policy 
objectives it is intended to achieve.  If Section 181 is amended to allow the introduction 
of some form of revenue sharing, the important task of defining the purposes of such a 
program and the examination of alternative means to those ends still lies ahead.  
Special Districts and Compilation of Local Fiscal Data.  As attested by the 
reliance of the Task Force and other analysts on US Census data, and as already indicated 
by some of the preceding discussion, the state of Kentucky has not as yet developed an 
adequate system for the compilation and reporting of data on local government finances.  
The situation regarding special districts, public authorities, and other special 
governmental entities is particularly problematic. Theoretically, every unit of government 
in the state is supposed to file an annual uniform financial information report (UFIR), but 
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At present, it appears that there is no reliable and comprehensive compilation that 
identifies these governmental units and that can be used to analyze their revenues, 
expenditures, borrowing, or other financial and fiscal data.  Under these circumstances,  
the Task Force was unable to examine in any systematic way the role of these 
governmental entities in Kentucky’s fiscal system.   
This situation can be remedied relatively easily and at modest cost, as the Task 
Force has recommended.  Until this is done, policy analysis and evaluation is undermined 
and the state is exposed to potentially significant financial risks.  To gauge the kinds of 
risks that may be involved, consider the findings of a study by Bridges (2005), which   
attempts to gather data on borrowing by public authorities in several metropolitan areas 
in Kentucky.  This study examines six large jurisdictions (Jefferson and Fayette counties, 
Bowling Green, Florence, Owensboro, and Paducah) and finds that special public 
authorities within some of these jurisdictions account for 80% or more of total local 
indebtedness. Information about this borrowing is not readily available to the public, and 
thus the residents of localities in the Commonwealth may be exposed to significant 
liabilities associated with the activities of public authorities of which they are unaware.   
More generally, as noted already in connection with HB44, there is a dearth of 
information regarding local fiscal policies in Kentucky.  It is often argued that local 
governments, being “closer to the people,” can be monitored and controlled relatively 
easily by their residents, creating a presumption that they are more responsive to local 
demands than higher-level governments.  This basic perspective, articulated in a classic 
paper by Tiebout (1956) and developed in an extensive literature for the past half century, 
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the absence of such information, local governments may be “captured” by interest groups 
or may simply fail to perform in accordance with the demands of local residents.  
The absence of adequate data regarding local finances undoubtedly limited the 
scope of Task Force activities.  The establishment of a special Task Force to examine 
local finances is an unusual event, and it is a pity that the Commonwealth has missed an 
exceptional opportunity for a more thorough investigation of important policy issues due 
to the poor quality of local financial and fiscal data.  Future policy deliberations can be 
significantly enhanced by the development of modern financial reporting systems for all 
local governments within the state, including regular and transparent publication of fiscal 
data for public use.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
The Task Force on Local Taxation has touched upon several important issues and 
has left others for future discussion and analysis.  Its recommendations for constitutional 
amendments highlight the desirability of enhanced flexibility for the General Assembly 
to introduce new financing options for local governments.   The Task Force report does 
not, however, examine the potential desirability of enhanced flexibility for local taxation 
within the existing constitutional boundaries.  In particular, it recognizes the potential 
importance of HB44 restrictions on local property taxation but does not seriously 
consider the potential advantages, in the form of increased local revenue autonomy, that 
might flow from the relaxation or removal of these restrictions.  The Task Force report 
also has little to say about statutory limitations on local occupational tax rates.  There 
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pressures under which localities operate also constrain local taxation even in the absence 
of statutory restraints.  But, in any event, a review and reconsideration of the specific 
types local tax limitations in Kentucky is in order.  For instance, after more than 25 years 
of HB44 property tax limitations, is there any basis for a presumption that a limit of 4% 
annual growth in property tax revenues serves public interests better than a limit of 3% or 
5%? Is there a persuasive justification for limits on occupational tax rates for counties 
and school districts but not for municipalities?  On what basis can the present limits on 
occupational tax rates be justified?  In the absence of careful review and analysis, 
predicated on the availability of underlying fiscal data, the present system appears to be 
somewhat haphazard in design and it effects, largely unknown. 
The Task Force identifies serious limitations in the availability of basic 
information concerning local government finances and recommends that these 
deficiencies be remedied.  Especially given the current state of data management 
technologies, the cost of these remedies is modest and the benefits – to policymakers, to 
analysts, and, above all, to the general public – are great.  If these recommendations are 
implemented, researchers and analysts, both within the public sector as well as outside, 
will be able to shed significant new light on local fiscal policies and their impacts.  This 
information would be of great value in future deliberations regarding the possible 
introduction of local sales taxation, revenue sharing, or other policy options. In addition, 
better data on local finances can assist in the monitoring and control of borrowing and 
financial management by special districts and public authorities, thus reducing financial 
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benefits in the form of reduced borrowing costs as well.  
The development of local government finances in Kentucky is still a work in 
progress.  Major policy issues regarding government structure, the assignment of 
functional responsibilities among levels of government, and the proper sphere of local 
revenue autonomy await further analysis. If the recommendations of the Task Force are 
followed, these issues will soon command the attention of policymakers and the public. 
Immediate improvements in data and support for significant analytical work can help to 




1.  Several studies and reports may be consulted by readers seeking more 
detailed information about local government finance in Kentucky.  Hoyt (2001) and 
Boardmand (2006) have contributed important treatments of this subject in previous 
issues of the Kentucky Annual Economic Report.  In connection with the work of the 
Task Force on Local Taxation, the Legislative Research Commission (LRC) (n.d., 2006a) 
has prepared very informative surveys and reviews of local taxation, including much 
more detail than is provided below concerning the laws regulating local government 
finance.  Wildasin (2001) also reviews local government finance issues in Kentucky.  All 
of these studies also contain references to additional sources of information on this 
subject.  
  242.  For the sake of simplification, this discussion omits some of the technical 
details of HB44 and other regulations governing local taxation.  For more discussion, see, 
e.g., Wildasin (2001) and LRC (n.d., 2006a). 
3.  Assuming that annual PVA documentation has been preserved, it would likely 
be possible, at comparatively modest cost, to compile these data and thus to provide a 
meaningful foundation for the evaluation of HB44’s impact.  
4.  It should be noted, however, that the recent state tax reform, which presumably 
conforms with Section 181 of the constitution, Recently, the responsibility for the 
collection of taxes on telecommunications services was transferred from localities to the 
state government, with the revenues to be distributed to the localities in accordance with 
their previous levels of collections. Although this arrangement presumably conforms with 
Section 181 of the constitution, it could be characterized as a system of state collection of 
revenues on behalf of local governments.  
5. In weighing the attractiveness of possible tax substation reforms, it is important  
to consider interactions between the Federal and state tax systems.  Local occupational 
and property taxes are generally deductible for purposes of Federal personal income 
taxation, reducing the net burden of these taxes, while the deductibility of sales taxes has 
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  26TABLE 1
Level and Composition of State and Local Government Revenues, US and Kentucky, 2003-2004
(Dollar figures in thousands.)
Revenues, State & local Share of  Share of own- Share of  Local Share of  Share of own- Share of
type government general  source general tax  government general  source general tax 
combined revenue (%) revenue (%)revenue (%) revenue (%) revenue (%)revenue (%)
General revenue 22,982,302 100% 9,184,914 100%
Intergovernmental revenue 6,241,782 27% 4,030,875 44%
     From Federal Government 347,912 4%
     From State government 3,682,963 40%
General revenue from own sources    16,740,520 73% 100% 5,154,039 56% 100%
    Taxes    11,460,494 50% 68% 100% 2,997,094 33% 58% 100%
          Property 2,136,455 19% 1,680,995 56%
          Sales and gross receipts    4,313,337 38% 307,030 10%
               General sales    2,477,717 22% 11,684 0%
               Selective sales 1,835,620 16% 295,346 10%
                    Motor fuel 476,605 4% - 0%
                    Alcoholic beverage 79,104 1% - 0%
                    Tobacco products 20,627 0% - 0%
                    Public utilities    207,280 2% 207,280 7%
                    Other selective sales    1,052,004 9% 88,066 3%
          Individual income    3,629,392 32% 809,999 27%
          Corporate income    381,538 3% - 0%
          Motor vehicle license    207,904 2% 2,590 0%
          Other taxes    791,868 7% 196,480 7%
     Charges and misc. general  revenue 5,280,026 23% 32% 2,156,945 23% 42%
Revenues, State & local Share of  Share of own- Share of  Local Share of  Share of own- Share of
 type government general  source general tax  government general  source general tax 
combined revenue (%) revenue (%) revenue (%) revenue (%) revenue (%) revenue (%)
General revenue 1,889,740,590 100% 1,094,729,372 100%
Intergovernmental revenue 425,682,586 23% 430,114,245 39%
     From Federal Government 50,988,684 5%
     From State government 379,125,561 35%
General revenue from own sources    1,464,058,004 77% 100% 664,615,127 61% 100%
    Taxes    1,010,277,275 53% 69% 100% 419,863,497 38% 63% 100%
          Property 318,242,461 32% 307,528,431 73%
          Sales and gross receipts    360,628,892 36% 67,303,155 16%
               General sales    244,891,334 24% 46,942,486 11%
               Selective sales 115,737,558 11% 20,360,669 5%
                    Motor fuel 34,943,572 3% 1,181,153 0%
                    Alcoholic beverage 4,985,706 0% 392,410 0%
                    Tobacco products 12,625,780 1% 322,515 0%
                    Public utilities    21,426,576 2% 10,717,400 3%
                    Other selective sales    41,755,924 4% 7,747,191 2%
          Individual income    215,214,667 21% 18,959,532 5%
          Corporate income    33,715,793 3% 3,486,756 1%
          Motor vehicle license    18,708,983 2% 1,372,855 0%
          Other taxes    63,766,479 6% 21,212,768 5%
     Charges and misc. general  revenue 453,780,729 24% 31% 244,751,630 22% 37%
Source: Bureau of the Census
United States Total
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